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Recent neuroimaging studies of the psychedelic state, which have commanded great media attention, are 
reviewed. They show that psychedelic trances are consistently accompanied by broad reductions in brain 
activity, despite their experiential richness. This result is at least counterintuitive from the perspective of 
mainstream physicalism, according to which subjective experience is entirely constituted by brain activity. In 
this brief analysis, the generic implications of physicalism regarding the relationship between the richness of 
experience and brain activity levels are rigorously examined from an informational perspective, and then made 
explicit and unambiguous. These implications are then found to be non-trivial to reconcile with the results of 
said neuroimaging studies, which highlights the significance of such studies for the mind-body problem and 
philosophy of mind in general.
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Introduction
Recently, two remarkable neuroimaging studies of the neural correlates of the 
psychedelic state have been completed: the first investigated the effects of psilocybin, 
the main psychoactive compound in magic mushrooms (Carhart-Harris et al 2012), while 
the second focused on lysergic acid diethylamide, or LSD (Carhart-Harris et al 2016). 
The first study has shown that, despite the significantly higher richness of experience 
reported by subjects on psilocybin when compared to those on placebo, measurements 
of Cerebral Blood Flow (CBF) with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
indicated that psilocybin caused only reductions of neural activity. No increases in CBF 
were seen anywhere in the brain. In the second study, localized increases in CBF were 
observed in the visual cortex of subjects on LSD, but magnetoencephalography (MEG)—
which performs a more direct measurement of neural activity than CBF—again revealed 
reductions in activity throughout the brain. The slight discrepancy in CBF measurements 
between the two studies was explained by the researchers in the following manner: ‘One 
must be cautious of proxy measures of neural activity (that lack temporal resolution), 
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such as CBF … lest the relationship between these measures, and the underlying neural 
activity they are assumed to index, be confounded by extraneous factors, such as a direct 
vascular action of the drug’ (Carhart-Harris et al 2016, 5). They proceeded to say that 
‘more direct measures of neural activity (e.g., EEG and MEG) … should be considered 
more reliable indices of the functional brain effects of psychedelics’ (Carhart-Harris et al 
2016, 6).
The results of both studies thus indicate that the psychedelic state is consistently 
associated with reductions of brain activity, despite the significant increases in the 
richness of experience reported by subjects. From the point of view of the metaphysics 
of physicalism, which entails that experience is constituted by brain activity alone, such 
results are at least counterintuitive. Indeed, neuroscientist Christof Koch commented that, 
‘to the great surprise of many, psilocybin, a potent psychedelic, reduces brain activity’ 
(Koch 2012, my italics). But does this observation strictly contradict physicalism? Does 
physicalism imply that an increase in the richness of experience must be accompanied by 
an increase in brain activity?
In this brief analysis, the implications of physicalism regarding the relationship 
between subjective experience and brain activity will be rigorously examined from 
an informational perspective. The goal is to establish whether the results reported in 
the neuroimaging studies cited above can be reconciled with physicalism and, if so, 
under what circumstances. Indeed, as neuroimaging advances and its applications 
begin to touch on difficult and nuanced problems in neuroscience and philosophy of 
mind, it becomes crucially important that the related implications of physicalism be 
unambiguously understood. This is what is attempted here. As such, although this brief 
analysis focuses only on the psychedelic studies cited, its relevance potentially extends to 
many more areas of neuroscientific investigation.
The Implications of Physicalism
Physicalism posits that there are physical entities independent of experience and 
that the qualities of experience are constituted by particular arrangements of such 
entities. More specifically, under physicalism the qualities of experience are constituted 
by particular patterns of brain activity, which are called the ‘Neural Correlates of 
Consciousness’ (NCCs). Notice that I use the word ‘activity’ here in the broad and generic 
sense of metabolism itself, so that only a dead, non-metabolizing brain has no activity.
Not all brain activity consists of NCCs: under physicalism, there are also unconscious 
neural processes. Reductions in these unconscious processes don’t necessarily imply 
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reductions in experience, for they aren’t NCCs. In fact, if these unconscious processes are 
inhibitory in nature, their reduction could even cause an increase in NCCs and, therefore, 
experience. As such, nothing precludes an increase in NCCs from being accompanied by a 
comparatively greater decrease in unconscious processes, leading to an overall decrease in 
brain activity. Clearly then, physicalism does not necessarily imply that more experience 
should always correlate with more total brain activity.
But here is the critical point: under physicalism, an increase in the richness of 
experience does need to be accompanied by an increase in the metabolism associated 
with the NCCs, for experiences are supposedly constituted by the NCCs. Let us unpack 
this carefully.
Rich experiences span a broader information space in awareness than comparatively 
dull and monotonic experiences. This is fairly easy to see: the experience of seeing a 
colorful fireworks display entails more information in awareness than staring at an 
overcast night sky. Listening to Bach’s Brandenburg Concertos entails more information 
in awareness than sitting in a relatively silent room. Having an intense dream entails more 
information in awareness than deep sleep. And so on. There clearly are such things as 
richer and duller experiences.
The concept of information is crucial here: it is a measure of how many different 
states can be discerned in a system. More information means that the system comprises 
more states that can be discerned from each other (Shannon, 1948). In the case of human 
experience, information reflects the amount of subjectively apprehended qualities that 
can be discerned from each other in awareness. Watching a fireworks display entails 
more information than staring at a dark sky because one can discern more shapes, colors, 
movements and levels of brightness in the former case. Listening to the Brandenburg 
Concertos entails more information than sitting in a relatively silent room because one 
can discern more tones, rhythms, timbres and levels of volume in the former case. To say 
that an experience is richer thus means that the experience entails more information in 
awareness.
Information states can be discerned in time (such as the progressive unfolding of 
notes in a symphony) and space (such as the different shapes and colors within a single 
snapshot of a fireworks display). In practice, however, a single moment is experientially 
intangible. The bulk of the information within awareness is associated with how 
many, and how often, qualities change over time. Therefore, when we speak of richer 
experiences we essentially mean experiences wherein a higher number of discernible 
qualities change more frequently.
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Now, since physicalism entails that there is nothing to the qualities of experience 
but the states of its physical substrate, an increase in the richness of experience can 
only be explained by more, and/or more frequent, state changes in the parts of the 
brain corresponding to the associated NCCs. We call these physiological state changes 
metabolism, or neural activity. Therefore, a relative increase in local metabolism is 
necessary to create the broader information space in the brain that supposedly constitutes 
the broader information space in awareness entailed by richer experiences. This is an 
inescapable implication of physicalism. Without it, subjective experience would become 
decoupled from the workings of the living brain information-wise. Operationally, thus, 
physicalism implies a form of local proportionality: the richness of experience must be 
proportional to the compound metabolic level of the NCCs, even though it doesn’t need 
to be proportional to the total level of activity in the brain.
An analogy may be helpful at this point. If we model the brain as a cellular 
automaton (e.g. Gers, Garis, & Korkin 2005), metabolism is a measure of how many, 
and how often, cells change states as time goes by (a ‘cell’ in a cellular automaton 
doesn’t necessarily correspond to a neuron, mind you). A brain displaying high activity 
corresponds to an automaton wherein many cells change states frequently. A brain 
displaying low activity corresponds to an automaton wherein a few cells change states 
now and then. The conclusion from the discussion above can thus be restated as follows: 
richer experiences, under physicalism, must correlate with an increase in the number of 
cells encompassed by the NCCs, and/or more frequent state changes in said cells.
Notice that this is a generic conclusion derived from first-principles informational 
considerations. It is independent of the exact nature of the NCCs. Neural spiking, 
neurotransmitter releases, fluctuations of membrane potentials, network configurations, 
communication or information integration patterns across neurons, etc.: whatever the 
NCCs turn out to be or encompass, it remains a direct implication of physicalism that 
an increase in the richness of experience needs to be accompanied by an increase in the 
compound level of metabolism associated with the NCCs.
Interpreting the Neuroimaging of the Psychedelic State
Given the previous section’s conclusion, what does it mean for the plausibility 
of physicalism that psychedelic trances are not accompanied by increases in brain 
activity? The first thing to consider is that psychedelic trances entail a significant 
increase in the richness of experience when compared to an ordinary baseline. This is 
not only overwhelmingly attested by informal reports (such as those available online 
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at, for instance, the ‘Erowid Experience Vaults’), it has also been confirmed in controlled 
studies. In the first study cited above, subjects on psilocybin reported extremely vivid 
imagination, dream-like experiences and complex perceptual hallucinations (Carhart-
Harris et al 2012, 2138-2139), which characterized the psychedelic state unambiguously 
as experientially richer—i.e. spanning a broader information space in awareness—than 
the placebo state. In an earlier study, subjects characterized the psychedelic state as 
extremely rich, intense and even ‘more real than real’ (Strassman 2001). In yet another 
study, 67% of the subjects rated a psychedelic experience as among the top five most 
spiritually significant of their life, considering ‘the meaningfulness of the experience to 
be similar, for example, to the birth of a first child or death of a parent’ (Griffiths et al 
2006, 276-277). It is difficult to imagine how this could fail to imply that a psychedelic 
experience is richer than most other experiences in life. Thus, under physicalism, one 
would have expected the psychedelic neuroimaging studies cited above to have shown 
unambiguous local increases in brain activity corresponding to the NCCs. How can we 
reconcile physicalism with the fact that this was not the case? There are two hypotheses.
The first hypothesis is that the spatial resolution of fMRI may have been too coarse 
for researchers to discern between (a) hypothetical NCCs whose activity did increase and 
(b) unconscious processes right ‘on top of’ said hypothetical NCCs, whose metabolic drop 
masked the activity rise of the NCCs. But this possibility stretches plausibility, for it entails 
the rather unlikely coincidence that each and every NCC was consistently accompanied 
by an unconscious process intermingled with it, whose metabolism happened to 
decrease so significantly as to mask the corresponding NCC increase. There is no reason 
why these different neural processes should unfold in such a perfect spatio-temporal 
intermingling. Indeed, different neural processes are normally discernible from each other 
in neuroimaging, otherwise neuroimaging wouldn’t be of much use in the first place.
The second hypothesis is that all the information entailed by the psychedelic 
experience—and, therefore, the corresponding level of metabolism—is already in the 
baseline brain activity of the subjects. Prior to drug intake, the information is simply not 
in the NCCs. In other words, the ‘trip’ may unfold in the brain at all times, in the form 
of unconscious processes. The psychedelic compound may simply convert those existing 
unconscious processes into NCCs, which then brings the trip into awareness. What this 
conversion may entail and how it may happen remains completely unclear and highly 
speculative, but the hypothesis could, at least in principle, explain why no activations 
were observed with respect to the placebo baseline: subjects who received placebo may 
have also been ‘tripping’ subliminally, displaying all the corresponding metabolism.
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There are two problems with this second hypothesis. The first is that it implies that 
the brain of every person is busy physically computing a ‘trip’ all the time, below the 
threshold of awareness. To put this in context, notice that psychedelic ‘trips’ often include 
voyages to indescribable parallel realms; death- and birth-like experiences; conversations 
with what is often described as alien entities or deities; unfathomable and countless 
insights into the underlying nature of reality and self; the witnessing of indescribably 
complex structures and motion; synesthetic traversals of the entire gamut of human 
emotions and beyond; etc. (Strassman 2001 & Strassman et al 2008). It is at least difficult 
to conceive of a reason why evolution would have led to brains that systematically wasted 
energy and considerable cognitive resources to continuously maintain useless subliminal 
‘tripping.’ To put it in perspective, consider for instance what can be accomplished in art 
or engineering with the cognitive resources associated with imagining a single complex 
structure in movement. Many of us have difficulties with simple 3D perspective, let alone 
the movements of complex structures. Yet, the hypothesis here implies that we are all 
subliminally wasting many more resources than this all the time. Such an idea seems, 
again, to stretch plausibility.
The second problem with the second hypothesis is this: in another brain imaging 
study, researchers used fMRI to measure the neural activity of subjects as they slept and 
dreamed (Horikawa et al 2013). The metabolic activity corresponding to dreaming up 
trivial visual experiences, such as seeing a person take a photograph or staring at a bronze 
statue (Costandi 2013), was clearly identifiable. So the added metabolism of dreaming up 
trivial images is significant enough to be picked out from the baseline activity wherein, ex 
hypothesi, unfathomable psychedelic ‘tripping’ is continuously taking place. This suggests 
that the metabolic level of the hypothetical subliminal ‘trip’ cannot be overwhelmingly 
higher than that of the trivial dream. If it were, the activity signal of the dream would 
have been mere noise, indiscernible from the baseline. Yet, in terms of information 
richness, the experience of e.g. staring at a bronze statue is negligible in comparison to 
that of a full-blown psychedelic trance. Therefore, given the previous section’s conclusion, 
the trivial dreams should have been metabolically negligible and indiscernible from the 
baseline, which reduces the second hypothesis to a contradiction.
In conclusion, both hypotheses conceived to reconcile physicalism with the results 
of recent neuroimaging studies of the psychedelic state are implausible. At present, it 
remains unclear if and how physicalism can accommodate such neuroimaging results. 
This, of course, does not mean that the results outright refute physicalism in and of 
themselves. Other hypotheses may exist that have not been considered in this brief 
analysis and further studies of the neural correlates of the psychedelic state may reframe 
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the current results. Until more clarity is achieved, however, one is left with this sobering 
thought: dreams and psychedelic trances are analogous in that neither can be attributed 
to sensory inputs, both being entirely imagined experiences. Yet, in a dream, when one 
experiences something as dull as staring at a bronze statue, the corresponding brain 
activations can be clearly discerned by fMRI. But when one undergoes psychedelic trances 
rated by 67% of subjects as one of the five most significant experiences of their lives, no 
conclusive activations can be discerned anywhere in the brain.
Conclusions
The generic implications of the physicalist metaphysics regarding the relationship 
between the richness of experience and brain activity levels have been rigorously 
examined and made explicit and unambiguous. The examination was done from 
the perspective of informational first principles. Recent neuroimaging studies of the 
psychedelic state have also been reviewed and their results found to be non-trivial to 
reconcile with said generic implications of physicalism. This suggests that either (a) 
future research into the neural correlates of the psychedelic state will reframe the present 
results in a manner more amenable to physicalist interpretations; (b) new interpretative 
hypotheses will emerge to accommodate the present results under plausible physicalist 
scenarios; or (c) neuroimaging studies of the psychedelic state will render physicalism 
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